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Napredak u administrativnoj decentralizaciji zemalja u tranziciji 
– komparativna analiza
Decentralizacija ima važno značenje u kontekstu europskih integracija, s obzirom 
na nastojanje stvaranja ujedinjene Europe sastavljene od pomoćnih prostornih jedinica, a 
i „Europa regija” tema je mnogih političkih diskusija. Od ranih 1990-ih Europska zajed-
nica, kasnije Europska unija, promiče ideju administrativne decentralizacije i u zemljama 
u tranziciji. Decentralizacija je i jedan od uvjeta pristupa Europskoj uniji, ali tom procesu 
suprotstavila  se tradicija centralističkog uređenja koja svoje korijene dijelom vuče iz 
razdoblja komunističkog upravljanja i on se mogao sprovesti djelomično i uz poteškoće. 
U ovom članku uspoređuju se napori i do sad postignuti rezultati u zemljama istočne 
i jugoistočne Europe u formiranju lokalne i regionalne samouprave. Poseban naglasak 
stavljen je na regionalnu razinu na koju se prijenos centralne vlasti odvio kasnije i samo u 
manjoj mjeri. Također, naglasak je stavljen na analizu preklapanja administrativnih regija 
s povijesnim regionalnim i kulturnim identitetima.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative decentralisation in the sense of a transfer of administrative compe-
tencies from superordinate to subordinate territorial-administrative units has an important 
meaning in the context of European integration, since a Europe composed of subsidiary 
spatial units is to be constructed and a ”Europe of regions” is on the agenda of many political 
discussions. From the early 1990s, the European Communities (EC), later the European 
Union (EU), promoted the idea of administrative decentralisation also in transformation 
countries. For EU accession, decentralisation was made one of the prerequisites. But it 
met centralistic traditions originating not only in the Communist era and could partly be 
enforced only with considerable difficulties. 
The paper investigates in a comparative way the efforts made and the results achieved 
so far in East-Central and Southeast European countries to establish local as well as regio-
nal self-government.1 A special focus is laid on the regional level, to which administrative 
powers have been devolved only later and partly insufficiently. Special attention is also 
paid to the correspondence of administrative regionalisation with historical regional and 
cultural identities (cf. a.o. to Paasi 1995). 
The two examples (Croatia, Poland) are just to illustrate the way how every single 
country was regarded. The comparative view, especially the final synopsis as represented 
by Fig. 1 – not the presentation of new findings on an individual country like, e.g., Croa-
tia – is the potential merit of this paper. Croatia has been taken as an example, since this 
article is to be published in Croatia. There is no claim that this article presents anything 
new or so far unknown on the Croatian administrative system.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE 
DECENTRALISATION PROCESS IN THE TRANSFORMATION COUNTRIES 
OF EASTERN EUROPE
In the course of the transformation process, the countries of Central and Southeast 
Europe increasingly came under the influence of the European Communities, which had 
become the European Union in 1994. They accepted this and were themselves (with some 
initial, but in the end only a few exceptions) very eager regarding integration. Amongst 
other things, this meant the consideration of the principle of subsidiarity2 as it is represented 
by the EU (Preamble and Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty).
However, in contrast particularly to West-Central Europe (Switzerland, Germany, 
Austria), there is little tradition of subsidiarity in the transformation countries of Eastern 
Europe. This applies especially to East and Southeast Europe, to a lesser extent to East-
Central Europe, where the countries belonging to the Austrian part of the Austrian-Hun-
garian Monarchy as well as Transylvania [Ardeal], Croatia, but also Poland and Hungary, 
feature certain federalist traditions.
The centralistic administrative principle that was used early on by the Roman and 
Eastern Roman Empire was faithfully continued by Byzantium and carried into all parts 
of Byzantine-dominated East and Southeast Europe. The Ottoman Empire also adopted 
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centralism along with other political and social models (e.g. the close connection between 
Church and State).
The young nation states, including those in East-Central Europe with clear subsi-
diary traditions, which formed after the disintegration of the multinational empires (the 
Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, the Russian Tsardom) during the 19th and 20th 
centuries, were additionally impressed and influenced by the French model of a unitarian 
and centralist state.3
Eventually, the principle of centralism was deepened across all of East-Central, East 
and Southeast Europe by half a century of Communism, which was a centralist ideology 
par excellence, even though some Communist countries (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, 
the Soviet Union) had federative structures (cf. to Jordan, Slawinski 1989; Roggemann 
1980). But even here, the all-powerful Communist parties (the ”Communist League” in 
Yugoslavia) controlled every level of the state and of society right down to the smallest 
political and economic unit. 
In addition to these older factors, which still reverberate strongly today, the current 
situation provides good reasons, which support centralism.
Fig. 1   Synopsis of all subnational administrative systems in East-Central and Southeast Europe as of 1.1.1989 
(upper part of the scheme) compared to 1.1.2007 (lower part of the scheme)
Sl. 1. Pregled svih subnacionalnih administrativnih sustava u istočnoj i jugoistočnoj Europi na dan 1.1. 1989. 
(gornji dio prikaza) i 1.1. 2007. (donji dio prikaza)
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In part, large national/ethnic/cultural minorities are often perceived as a threat to the 
unity of the nation state. It is feared that allowing the regions where they live a greater 
degree of self-government is tantamount to increasing this threat. Equally, regions with 
a strong cultural identity are sometimes viewed as a danger for the state unity. For this 
reason, they should not receive additional support through self-government. Both of 
these factors are closely related to the new sovereignty, only recently (with great effort) 
obtained and often perceived as vulnerable. Centralist attitudes are often justified by po-
inting to the political apathy of the population, which is widespread in post-Communist 
countries, particularly among members of the older generation and in rural areas. This 
supports the argument that self-government at a regional and local level meets with little 
interest anyway, and is of use to very few. A further common argument used by defenders 
of centralist administration is the reference to the (genuinely existing) lack of qualified 
administrative staff, particularly in rural areas and at the lower administrative levels. By 
shifting competencies to the subnational levels, one causes the quality of public admini-
stration and services to decline.
Against this background, it is of no surprise that decentralisation in former Communist 
Europe proceeded only sluggishly and was often half-heartedly managed by national go-
vernments. The governments accepted it as a condition of European integration, but rarely 
acknowledged that it may well be in the interests of their own country. This is particularly 
true for the regional level in terms of the large and medium-sized administrative units of 
the NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 dimension according to the European Union (EU) classification 
system.4 In contrast, the local level, which consists of many small and therefore ”harmless” 
units (usually called ”communes”, NUTS-4, NUTS-5) was allocated many competencies 
relatively quickly, though often without assigning adequate financial coverage. However, 
it should be recognised, that similar conditions prevail to a large extent in the ”old” EU 
states such as France or Greece.
The European institutions (EU, European Council) have several reasons for supporting 
decentralisation and especially regionalisation5:
• Both processes correspond to the principle of subsidiarity, which forms part of the 
guiding idea of the EU and the European Council. 
• They cause the diffusion of democracy across all political levels. 
• They contribute to the preservation of European cultural diversity, because ”regions are 
the cultural building blocks of Europe”.
• They allow the EU to distribute its (significant) funds for regional and structural support 
directly to the competent territorial-administrative units, rather than to the state gover-
nments, which then determine the allocation. 
The primary incentive behind many of these motives is presumably the notion that, 
following World War II, the European integration project must overcome the nation state 
and the associated excesses of nationalism, which have caused Europe so much harm in the 
past two centuries. In order to achieve this it is necessary to break the power of the nation 
states and to shift some of their competencies to levels of the EU on the one hand, and to 
the level of regions and communes on the other hand. This has proved to be a laborious 
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process, firstly because strong powers and interests continue to operate for the benefit of 
the nation states and because this process, secondly, has to be driven by representatives 
of the nation states themselves, who consequently effectively disempower themselves.
European identity and European awareness, but also regional identities and regional 
awareness would be very helpful here. A European awareness is still barely developed. 
Regional awareness and regional identities do exist, to a certain extent even in those 
countries that are not far advanced in the process of regionalisation. They are often only 
covered by a thin veil of national identity and could not even be made to disappear in areas 
where totalitarian Communist regimes particularly pursued this objective by introducing 
frequent changes to the administrative structure.
The strengthening of regional identities and regionalisation could be in a position to 
halt nationalism and to reduce the likelihood of large-scale conflicts. Switzerland offers of 
good example of this: thinking in national categories (German, French, Italian) is signifi-
cantly fractured by the existence of small, but politically and financially powerful cantons.6 
Political control and structural support by the EU could also ensure that the de-
velopment of ”regional feudalisms” and the increase of socio-economic disparities are 
prevented – two phenomena that are presented as arguments against regionalisation – and 
not without justification.
THE CASES OF POLAND AND CROATIA
Within this short article it is not possible to refer to all transformation countries in 
detail. (For a an extensive rendering of decentralisation processes in all transformation 
countries of East- Central and Southeast Europe see Jordan, 2010.) It is just space enough 
to highlight developments in two countries, i.e. Poland and Croatia. Poland stands for the 
case among transformation countries, which is the most advanced as regards decentra-
lisation. Croatia is highlighted, since it is in the focus of this journal. A common feature 
of both countries is the existence of distinct historical and cultural subnational identities 
forming potential models for administrative regionalisation. Chapter 4 again widens the 
view to all transformation countries comparing their relative progress in decentralisation.
Poland
Cultural and administrative traditions
From the very beginning, Poland developed as an aristocratic state with relatively 
weak royal power (central authority). With its territorial dominions (voivodeships) the 
powerful nobility shaped distinctive regional identities. These were further reinforced 
by the fact that, over the course of history, the function of capital of the nation wandered 
from Poznań to Cracow [Kraków] and on to Warsaw [Warzsawa]. The personal union 
(1386), and later the real union (1569) with Lithuania brought Poland dominance over an 
empire, which – next to the Habsburg Empire – was the most important adversary against 
the Ottoman Empire in Europe. In the late Middle Ages the Hanseatic League spread not 
only along the coastal regions, but also reached far into the interior of the country, e.g. as 
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far as Cracow. Together with other cities under German law they produced the bourgeoisie, 
which faced the sovereign and the nobility as a separate political force. Even before its 
three partitions in 1772, 1793 and 1795, the country was larger than it is today, and was 
located further to the east.
During the extremely formative phase of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century 
(industrialisation, railway construction), the total division among Prussia (later Germany), 
Austria, (later Austria-Hungary) and Russia from the late 18th century until World War I, 
produced very different economic and cultural influences in the three parts of the country, 
which reverberate to this day even though sections of the population were replaced after 
World War II.
In 1916, once again a ”core Poland” emerged, which expanded significantly until 
1923, moving to the east into areas that are Ukrainian and Belorussian today. The political 
post-war order forced Poland to shift to the west by 200-250 km, which brought with it 
a massive population transfer. It was as late as 1992 that this was finally sealed by the 
German-Polish agreements.
Communist post-war Poland retained the three-tier administrative system of the inter-
war period, with certain modifications, until 1974. In the territory of post-war Poland it was 
composed of 17 voivodeships [województwo]7 on the upper regional level, powiats [powiat] 
on the lower regional level and communes [gmina] on the local level. Until 1950 the latter 
enjoyed self-government. As cities, Warsaw and Łódź were treated like the voivodeships. 
The newly acquired, previously German territories were immediately incorporated into the 
existing system of voivodeships in 1945, though the 1937 state borders were not reflected 
on the voivodeship borders.
The large voivodeships in the west were subdivided in 1950, resulting in the three 
new voivodeships Koszalin, Zielona Góra and Opole. Later, the large cities of Poznań, 
Cracow and Wrocław were each bestowed the status of a voivodeship as well. The system 
was heavily centralised and self-government did not exist on any level.
The increasing power of the Communist party leaders within the voivodeships led 
the party central office to reinforce the competencies of the communes in 1972 and 1973, 
which in turn resulted in the polarisation of the balance of power between the voivodeships 
and the communes, and made the powiats appear superfluous. The administrative reform 
of 1975 took account of this, eliminated the level of the powiats, transferring most of their 
competencies to the communes and establishing 49 voivodeships (including 3 cities at the 
level of voivodeships), instead of the initial 17 (with 5 cities) (see also Jordan, Slawinski 
1989).
Developments 1989-2007 and the current territorial-administrative system
An initial administrative reform immediately after the political turn-around in 1990 
reintroduced the self-government of the communes in the form that had existed until 1950. 
The issue of the arrangement of the regional level triggered long discussions, mainly due 
to the number and size of the voivodeships, and these were not brought to a close until 
1999 and resulted in the three-tier system that still exists today.
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Since 1.1.1999 the Polish territorial-administrative system has been composed of 16 
voivodeships [województwo] on the upper regional level, 361 powiats [powiat] on the 
lower regional level, as well as 2,489 rural communes [gmina] and 65 urban communes 
[miasto] on the local level. The voivodeships correspond to the NUTS-2 level of the EU 
classification, the powiats to the NUTS-4 level, and the communes to the NUTS-5 level. 
All three levels are exclusively or additionally self-governing. 
The following were significant motives for this administrative reform, and in particular 
for the re-introduction of large voivodeships and a three-tier system as was in place until 
1975 (see Czyż 1999): the expectation of large-scale and efficient regional planning, the 
replacement of the ”artificial” Communist system, the alignment (of the voivodeships) 
with historical regions, the promotion of democratisation through self-government and 
the need to comply with the requirements of the EU.
In many cases, the 16 voivodeships do indeed correspond at least roughly to historical 
cultural regions, whose identity was frequently shaped early on in the Middle Ages, and 
which are firmly rooted in the consciousness of the population. They often also bear the 
names of these historical units and cultural landscapes: Greater Poland [województwo 
wielkopolskie], Lesser Poland [województwo malopolskie], Masovia [województwo 
mazowieckie], Pomerania [województwo pomorskie], Silesia [województwo śląskie], 
Podlachia [województwo podlaskie], to name just those that are better known. In most 
cases there is also a good match with the central place system, the functional regions of the 
large regional centres (macrocentres). However, in some cases they are too small for the 
central place macroregions and divide them further (especially Katowice, Cracow, Poznań, 
Gdańsk). Indeed, the initial reformation plans had only provided for 12 voivodeships. The 
larger number was the result of the consideration of local requests.  
The voivodeships simultaneously have institutions of self-government and of decon-
centrated state administration8 at their disposal. For the first time in Poland’s more recent 
history, the voivodeships are consequently self-governing. 
A parliament [sejmik województwa] is elected for a term of four years and it, in turn, 
elects the council of the voivodeship [zarząd województwa] as its government, as well as 
the president9 [marszałek województwa]. Voivodeships with up to 2 million inhabitants 
have 45 delegates; for every additional 500,000 inhabitants, 5 further delegates are added.
The governor [wojewoda] is a representative of the deconcentrated state administration, 
and counterbalances these institutions of self-government. He is appointed by the Polish 
Council of Ministers and is thus a representative of central government. However, the co-
uncil of the voivodeship has the nomination rights. The governor can annul decisions made 
by the self-government, if they are in violation of the national law. However, his decisions 
can be challenged before the administrative court. He is also responsible for public safety.
The revenues of the voivodeships are only self-generated to a very small extent (ma-
inly as a share of property tax and income tax). Instead, they primarily consist of national 
transfer payments. These, too, are severely restricted and have to be renegotiated year 
after year. Voivodeships have the option to enter into contracts with the state about the 
execution of particular functions, which are then specifically funded by the state (e.g. road 
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construction). Overall, this represents a rather weak financial basis for the execution of a 
considerable range of functions within self-government. Consequently, the effect of these 
competencies is very limited. Sometimes communes and powiats surrender functions to 
the voivodeships, together with the associated necessary funds.
The primary role of the 361 powiats is to support and coordinate the communes. They 
are exclusively self-governing. The powiat councils are elected for a term of four years 
and are made up of 20-60 delegates who, in turn, elect a chairman [starosta]. The compe-
tencies of the powiats are relatively restricted and consist mainly in the cooperation with 
the voivodeships and the communes in relation to their respective administrative territory.
In contrast, the 2,489 rural and 65 urban communes are endowed with much stron-
ger competencies. They are also relatively independent financially. For their budget they 
receive shares of the income tax revenue in the commune and they are allowed to own 
property. The communal council is elected for a term of four years and has the duty to 
elect the communal board, which holds the executive functions.
Furthermore, the Polish Constitution provides for the instrument of the referendum in 
relation to all three subnational administrative levels. This can be used to remove elected 
institutions from office. 
As far as the progress of the decentralisation process is concerned, it can be concluded 
that among all transformation countries, Poland has made the relatively greatest progress. 
It features self-government on all three subnational administrative levels; the NUTS-2 level 
is also furnished with self-governing territorial-administrative units and corresponds to a 
large extent with historically evolved cultural units. However, the financial resources of 
this administrative level in particular are highly insufficient.
In carrying out the spatial delineation of the voivodeships, the ”danger” of providing 
ethnic minorities with a better opportunity to represent their interests by gathering them 
in one administrative unit was not evaded, even though this ”danger” is objectively slight 
in view of the average Polish minority proportion of 3.3% (2002): for the benefit of the 
relatively most compact minority, the Germans in the area of Opole, the cultural region 
of Silesia was divided into three voivodeships. Thus, the Germans account for a share of 
10% of the total population in the Voivodeship of Opole [województwo opolskie] and have 
good opportunities to be represented in the Council of the Voivodeship.
Particularly in the 1990s, the driving forces of the decentralisation process in Poland 
were the trade union movement Solidarność in co-operation with the Roman Catholic 
Church.
Croatia
Cultural and administrative traditions
Similarly to Slovenia, Croatia was first established as an administrative unit in the 
current shape in 1945. Very much in contrast to Slovenia, however, Croatian statehood can 
be traced back very far into history, in fact to the 9th century (852). However, this statehood 
was subject to several interruptions (the last one from 1919 to 1939), referred to shifting 
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territories with shifting heartlands and varied in sovereignty from fully sovereign to a kind 
of autonomy (see Budak et al. 1995, Regan 2003). What is Croatia today was dominated 
for long periods by Venice along the Adriatic façade and by Hungary in the interior of the 
country, and later by Austria (1797-1805, 1813/15-1867) and Austria-Hungary (1867-1918) 
in both regions. Long-term territorial fragmentation and divergent rulers, each bringing 
with them their elites and cultural traditions, as well as late unification resulted, again very 
similarly to Slovenia, in very distinct patterns of historical and cultural regional identities.
And this, even though the main dividing line runs between the former countries of 
the Hungarian Crown and the former ”Austrian lands”, the latter being successors of the 
Venetian possessions, which lasted until 1797.
The formerly Hungarian lands were composed of Slavonia [Slavonija] and Croatia 
Proper, both with a high level of autonomy until 1918, as well as Baranya, Međimurje 
and Fiume [Rijeka] (a corpus separatum of the Hungarian Crown), all of which were 
integrated parts of the Kingdom of Hungary until 1918. Croatia Proper is in turn compo-
sed of several smaller cultural regions like Hrvatsko zagorje, Banija, Kordun, Lika and the 
Croatian Coastland [Hrvatsko primorje]. With the exception of Hrvatsko zagorje and the 
Croatian Coastland, the cultural and socio-economic milieu of these subregions is mainly 
the result of the Austrian Military Frontier [Vojna krajina] against the Ottoman Empire. 
For several centuries this functioned as a military glacis, was directly subordinated to the 
Court Council of War in Vienna and in this way was excluded from Croatian-Slavonian 
self-government.
The former Austrian lands also enjoyed considerable self-governance. With regard to 
the territory of modern Croatia, they were composed of the Croatian share in the former 
Austrian Littoral, i.e. Istria [Istra] and the Kvarner, as well as of Dalmatia [Dalmacija].
While the former Hungarian lands, except Rijeka and the Croatian Coastland, have a 
rather Pannonian or Central European character, the former Austrian provinces skirting 
the Adriatic Sea (as well as Rijeka and the Croatian Coastland) feature the results of a 
pronounced Mediterranean and Venetian influence.
In recent times, apart from Serbian separatism, which lead to a de facto secession of 
areas with a Serbian majority coinciding to a large extent with the former Military Frontier 
between 1992 and 1995, Istria has displayed the strongest signs of a regional consciousness. 
This culminated in some endeavours towards autonomy in the early 1990s. In the popula-
tion census of 1991, for example, 45% of the Istrian population declared ethnic affiliations 
other than Croatian, while 16% declared a ”regional” rather than a national affiliation (see 
also Heilborn, 1995). Istria had indeed never been part of any Croatian state before 1945.
With the exception of the years 1939-1941, when a Croatian Banate [Hrvatska ba-
novina] was established, neither inter-war Yugoslavia, nor Tito-Yugoslavia after World 
War II reflected these historical regions in their territorial-administrative structures (Regan 
2003). From 1967 onwards, the communes [općina] were enlarged to the size of districts 
and endowed with considerable powers of self-government, functioning as the only 
administrative units below the republican level. Ultimately, their number had reached 
102. With an average population of 40,000, however, they were too small to function as 
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regions. Mainly for purposes of regional planning, communes joined associations [zajednica 
općina]. The entire territory of Croatia was covered by a total of 11 of these communal 
associations. They were very well aligned with the central place system, though they 
were not territorial-administrative units10 in their own right, but merely associations of 
independent communes for certain purposes.
Developments 1989-2007 and the current territorial-administrative system
Croatia had declared independence from Yugoslavia together with Slovenia on 
25.6.1991, but continued to be troubled by violent conflicts until August 1995 and was 
burdened with significant refugee, political and economic problems for longer still.
In somewhat of a hurry and presumably also to prevent discussions, in 1993 Cro-
atia completely reorganised its territorial-administrative system based on a Law dated 
29.12.1992. It now consisted of 20 counties [županija] at the regional NUTS-3 level, plus 
the City of Zagreb [Grad Zagreb], which was equated to a county (Klemenčić 1993, p. 46, 
Borovac 2002, p. 348). This was achieved mainly by agglomerating existing communes. 
At that time, roughly a third of the country was not yet under the control of the Croatian 
state, but was occupied by the ”Republic of Serbian Krajina” [”Republika Srpska Krajina”], 
neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina was still in a situation of war and Croatia as such was 
certainly still in danger of being involved into this war (see Klemenčić 1997). This may 
go some way to explain why such a swift and centralistic approach was chosen.
In two counties (the Sisak-Moslavina County [Sisačko-moslavačka županija] and the 
Zadar-Knin County [Zadarsko-kninska županija]), subordinate self-governing districts 
[kotar] were established (Klemenčić 1993, p. 46). These were territories with a majority 
Serbian population. These districts were conceived as an offer to give Serbs in Croatia 
self-organisation and representation vis-à-vis county and state on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, because they were subordinated to counties with a Croatian majority population, 
they were presumably intended as a mechanism for controlling the Serbs.
After war and violent conflict had come to an end in Croatia (August 1995), the county 
system was modified in shape in 1996 and on 7.2.1997 (Borovac 2002, p. 348). These 
boundary alterations applied particularly to the territory of the former ”Serbian Republic” 
and the areas around Zagreb. The total number of counties remained the same. Only the 
two districts conceived for Serbian self-government were abandoned, as the majority of 
Serbs had been expelled from these areas in 1995, and returned later in much smaller 
numbers. There have been no further changes to the system of counties. 
The counties are self-governing territorial-administrative units. Their institutions are 
the elected county assembly [županijska skupština], the county government [županijsko 
poglavarstvo] with the county prefect [župan] at its head, who is elected by the assembly. 
In addition, some state functions are also transferred to the counties.
The counties procure their financing by levying taxes or (in the case of delegated state 
competencies) in the form of transfer payments from the state. Transfer payments from 
the state are also made available for the purpose of socio-economic disparity equalisation, 
should peripheral and economically weak counties not be able to finance their statutory 
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functions through self-generated revenues. Self-government at the county as well as at 
the local level was substantially reinforced in 2001, when centralistic attitudes prevailing 
in the Tuđman era (the 1990s) began to make way for other stances.
Although the county system split up the larger historical and cultural regions mentioned 
above, and only corresponds to smaller historical and cultural identities in three cases (the 
Istria County [Istarska županija] corresponds to Istria in the sense of the cultural region, 
not as a peninsula; the Dubrovnik-Neretva County [Dubrovačko-neretvanska županija] 
corresponds to the territory of the former city republic Ragusa [Dubrovnik]; Međimurje 
County [Međimurska županija] corresponds to the Međimurje region acquired from Hungary 
in 1919), it has established a kind of regional identity pattern itself in the meantime. It is, 
in general, well aligned with the central place system at the meso-level (meso-regions). 
For these reasons it has so far been able to withstand wider public discussions, which 
evolved in a more liberal political climate after the end of the Tuđman era (2000) and 
circled around the replacement of the county system by ”real” regions along the lines of 
historical and cultural units and in the dimensional range of NUTS-2. The most popular 
proposal brought forward encompassed five regions, i.e. Slavonia and Baranya [Slavo-
nija i Baranja], Dalmatia [Dalmacija], Central Croatia [Središnja Hrvatska], Littoral and 
Lika [Primorsko-lička regija] and the City of Zagreb [Grad Zagreb] (Slobodna Dalmacija 
23/8/2000, 7).
At the local level, the 102 large ”Yugoslavian-type” communes [općina] were replaced 
by 70 towns [grad] and 419 communes [općina] in 1992. By the time of the population 
census in 2001, the numbers had grown to 122 towns and 423 communes. As of 1.1.2007, 
the local administrative level comprised 127 towns and 429 communes, with an average 
of 100 sq. km and 8,000 inhabitants (NUTS-5). They are further subdivided into 6,751 
settlements [naselje] at NUTS-6 level. The significant reduction in size was motivated, 
amongst other things, by the experiences gained previously, i.e., that the former large 
communes had mainly favoured their centres, while other towns and larger settlements 
had lost economic activities and inhabitants. Another motive for the reduction in size was 
to bring the administration closer to the local population and local interests.
Any settlement with more than 10,000 inhabitants qualifies as a town in the legal 
sense. Smaller settlements can also be declared towns for specific historical and economic 
reasons. A town has an elected council [gradsko vijeće] and a government [gradsko pogla-
varstvo] headed by the president of the council or the mayor [gradonačelnik], respectively. 
A commune also has an elected Council [općinsko vijeće] and a government [općinsko 
poglavarstvo] headed by the president of the council or the mayor [općinski načelnik], 
respectively. In settlements, the population is usually represented by a local mayor.
In order to fulfil their functions they can levy their own taxes. National transfer 
payments support communes and towns that are financially weaker.
In 2007, three statistical regions were defined at the NUTS-2 level: Northwest Croatia 
[Sjeverozapadna Hrvatska], Central and East (Pannonian) Croatia [Središnja i istočna (Pa-
nonska) Hrvatska] and Adriatic Croatia [Jadranska Hrvatska]. They each combine several 
counties and replaced an earlier proposal for 4 statistical units, which, however, was rejected 
by the EU, because the regions did not have sufficient inhabitants. These statistical regions 
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do not have the status of territorial-administrative units within the administrative system.
Despite a wealth of predictions to the contrary, the regional level of counties, which 
was hastily implemented under difficult external conditions and previously had no tradition 
in this form, has proved to be surprisingly stable in Croatia. Even though their competen-
cies of self-government have been steadily expanded, they continue to correspond to the 
centralist concept, which formed the foundation for their implementation. This is because 
they are too small effectively to oppose central government, and they are unable to tap 
into the regional consciousness, which is oriented along the lines of the large cultural 
and historical units (see a.o. Pusich 1996). But it is precisely this regional consciousness 
combined with the highly varied cultural traditions that drive this state that is still young 
in years and has a very fragile national identity to push regionalisation forward at this 
level, rather than at the level of the large cultural-historical units. In this context, the small 
remaining group of Serbs (2001: 4.5%) that is widely scattered, no longer plays a part.
CONCLUSIONS
A synopsis of all subnational administrative systems in East-Central and Southeast 
Europe as of 1.1.1989 (upper part of the scheme) compared to 1.1.2007 (lower part of 
the scheme) shown in Fig. 1 suggests the following conclusions as regards progress of 
administrative decentralisation during the transformation period:
The local administrative level (NUTS-5; in Lithuania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mon-
tenegro, Serbia and Macedonia NUTS-4) is endowed with self-government, with the 
exception of Belorussia, which is a dictatorship. This self-government had already been 
established in the successor states of Yugoslavia during the Communist years, and was 
adopted by the other transformation countries immediately before or very soon after the 
political turn-around. It expresses the early quest for democratisation ”from the grass 
roots”, but with the small size of the local units it only embraces political dimensions that 
do not pose a threat to the central government.
The regional administrative levels (NUTS-2 to NUTS-4), on the other hand, are 
exclusively self-governed only in exceptional cases. Where, as in Hungary, Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is the case, the self-government is either endowed  with only 
moderate competencies (Hungary, Croatia) or it does not correspond to the ideal type 
of administrative regionalisation, but is rather a form of administratively supported and 
therefore solidified ethnic segregation (Bosnia-Herzegovina: entities on the NUTS-2 level 
and cantons at the NUTS-3 level in the federation). Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia 
have no regions. 
This deficit in the decentralisation process at the regional levels, in other words – 
with regard to a ”real” administrative regionalisation – can be explained by administrative 
traditions, but beyond that also primarily by the poorly consolidated national identity and 
statehood. Against this background, different central administrations are keen to interpret 
various signs (ethnic and other minorities, pronounced regional identities, gravitational 
pull of foreign centres, socio-economic spatial disparities, etc.) as good reasons for de-
monstrating restraint in this matter.
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New autonomies, in the sense of partial territories of a state that are endowed with 
special competencies of self-government, were exclusively the result of national move-
ments during the transformation phase (Gagauzia, Crimea; the Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina already existed at the time of Yugoslavia), while regionalist movements, which 
occurred frequently and with vehemence, (for example, Moravia, Istria, Transcarpathia) 
were not able to prevail.
Administrative traditions display a strong impact. Thus, for most successor states 
of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, deconcentrated state administration at the lower 
regional administrative level (NUTS-4) following the pattern of the Political Districts 
[Politischer Bezirk] during the end phase of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy is quite 
characteristic (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia). The different approaches chosen by 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina can be partially (Croatia) or fully (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
explained by the circumstances of war that prevailed in the 1990s. Hungary switched to a 
different model only recently. In Romania, the Romanian administrative system that was 
tailored after the French model, unfolded itself over large sections of the inner-Carpathian 
territories, which had belonged to Austria-Hungary until 1918.
In contrast, in most successor states of Communist Yugoslavia, the self-governing large 
communes were retained at the lower regional level (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Macedonia). Only Slovenia and Croatia returned to small communes immediately 
after gaining independence, this being the structure that had existed there prior to the years 
of Communist Yugoslavia.
In the successor states of the Soviet Union, state administration generally also com-
prises all regional levels of administration. To date, only a very partial loosening of the 
structure has been achieved through the introduction of elements of self-government.
What is less tangible in the synopsis, because it does not provide information about 
the competencies of self-government, the financial resources of self-government, the re-
lative size of self-governing territorial-administrative units, and the correlation between 
self-governing subnational units and cultural-spatial identities, is the lesser degree of 
decentralisation, particularly at the regional level, in the territories that were moulded 
by the Byzantine and Ottoman cultural traditions.  
NOTES
* The paper is based on research published in Committee of the Regions (1999), Jordan et al. (2001) and Jordan 
(2010). 
1   Self-government exists when the citizens of an administrative unit govern themselves through the institutions 
they directly elected.
2   The principle of subsidiarity is understood to be a political guideline that allows those duties, which can be 
carried out by a subordinate territorial-administrative unit, actually to be performed by these, by bestowing 
the required powers.
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3   Which had first developed from previously subsidiary structures, as it did in England, out of the emergence 
of Absolutism in the early Modern Age.
4   NUTS = Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques. The EU currently has 211 NUTS-2-regions with 
an average area of 15,800 sq.km and an average number of inhabitants of 1.747 million. At the NUTS-3-level 
there are 1,093 regions with an average area of 3,050 sq.km and an average number of inhabitants of 337,000.
5   Regionalisation in the administrative sense is understood to mean the subdivision of a state into larger territo-
rial-administrative units that are not attributable to the local level. It always applies across the entire national 
territory.
6   However, some examples also exist that show that regions support national thinking, in cases where their 
borders coincide with the settlement area of nations: Kosovo, the Basque Lands in Spain, the Serb Entity in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7   The official designation of the term in the local official language/s is always given in the singular nominative, 
even where the English expression does not correspond to number.
8   Deconcentrated state administration signifies that territorial-administrative units assume state competencies 
on a regional or local level, doing so on behalf of the state and with accountability towards state institutions. 
In this case, territorial-administrative units act as outposts of central state administration.
9  In this text, references to functional titles (e.g. his vice-mayor) always represent both the female and male 
form. It would impede legibility if both forms (his/her) were used throughout. The use of the female form 
only would introduce a greater discrepancy with reality, as the majority of officials are male at this time.
10  The term territorial-administrative unit describes a juridical person of the public administration with a terri-
torially defined sphere of operation. This definition does not include planning regions, development regions 
or statistical regions, which – as a rule – do not have their own legal personality and are merely regional or 
local institutions that are combined for a particular purpose.
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